




Responses to My Commentators
Mohan Matthen
The insights contained in this extraordinarily constructive set of commentaries have helped me develop my views on pleasure, and think more about how they relate to aesthetic value theory. To say I am grateful doesn’t begin to express how indebted I am to the commentators, and to Jenny McMahon for extremely helpful and enjoyable discussion.
1.	Prospect
This is my thesis:
The pleasure of art is (1) a conscious feeling of evaluation that (2) arises from a way of mentally engaging with a putative work of art that (3) facilitates and (4) motivationally reinforces this very way of engaging with it [see target article: Figure 2].
What makes this pleasure specifically aesthetic is the restriction to mental engagement with an object in clause (2). If broadened to include any activity, the statement above defines generic f-pleasure.
Many theorists focus on qualities that evoke passive appreciation in the receptive subject; they suppose that the philosopher’s task is to discover what these are. This is how Baumgarten approaches the matter: James Phillips says that for him, ‘the beautiful stands out as an object of perception’ [Phillips REF; my emphasis]. My focus, as Cynthia Freeland [Freeland: 77–125] and Keren Gorodeisky very clearly appreciate, is on the subject’s mental dispositions and the object’s correlative capacity to engage them. While this is compatible with an object possessing qualities that elicit appreciation, beauty and other such ‘value-laden facts’ [Gorodeisky REF; Robert Sinnerbrink: 168–175] do not act autonomously in my scheme. In particular, I reject the idea that the aesthetic subject acts simply by positioning herself to catch the flow of ‘vivid sensory representations’ [Neil Sinhababu REF] that emanate from art.
My main task in this response is to buttress my account of aesthetic pleasure. I then turn to aesthetic hedonism: the view that aesthetic pleasure determines aesthetic merit. I said very little about hedonism, but because some commentators challenge me on this, I will mark where I stand, deferring fuller treatment for another occasion.
2.	What is Pleasure?
In psychology, reward is a state of a subject that reinforces the behaviour that the subject tags as leading to this state. Pleasure is the conscious feeling of evaluation that attends reward.
Example: You ask me to spend a morning helping you clean out your garage. Unexpectedly, your company makes for a fun day. This makes it more likely that I will agree to such requests in the future. My action-disposition has been modified by the reward.
This is reinforcement learning. My conscious awareness of reward, manifested as a positive appraisal of the day’s activity, is pleasure.
Ryan Doran and Sinhababu tie pleasure to desire. Clearly there are close links; but in my scheme desire cannot replace pleasure, because reinforcement learning is not driven by any particular conception of the outcome. In the example above, the pleasure that reinforces my altruism was unexpected; it does not consist in any prior desire being satisfied. Fortuitous learning is structurally similar to Darwinian natural selection [target article: 495–503]. Just as random mutation is amplified when it results in increased fitness, so also an action is reinforced by reward even when it wasn’t performed for the sake of that reward.
It’s true that reinforcement learning can create desire. After learning, the subject may desire the pleasure of the rewarded activity. But this is not essential. When a Lipizzaner horse learns by conditioning to prance in a certain way, there’s no reason to think that it then either desires to prance or finds it pleasurable to do so. The same goes for pleasure-learned modes of art engagement. They are learned because they make the contemplation of certain works more pleasurable. These modes are not pleasurable in themselves; they are learned because they extract pleasure from certain works. They become automatic, like the Lipizzaner’s prancing. They do not make inferior works pleasurable; that’s why these works are inferior. Nor are they desire-driven; Sinhababu alludes to a ‘desire that the book instantiate particular features’, but I don’t have specific desires concerning the inferior works I sometimes encounter. What specific feature could I desire of this predictable potboiler? Surely not that it be better written; I just want it to go away.
My account of pleasure learning in art fits quite well with contemporary discussions of reinforcement learning (see for example Burke et al. [2007]). I am not clear whether Sinhababu means to question this.
3.	Learning by Pleasure
The reward–reinforcement structure is the foundation of my account of pleasure learning in art. Here’s a trivial example. Somebody told me as a teenager that classical European painters divide landscapes into foreground, middle ground, and background. The practice is very different from that used in the Persian tradition of illustration, where perspective and relative size play less of a role [http://tinyurl.com/zs7yl3t (​http:​/​​/​tinyurl.com​/​zs7yl3t​)]. This instruction gave me a new way of looking at European landscapes, which was reinforced by the pleasure they then gave me. My new way of looking releases a pleasure-learned facilitation nexus. Once I developed it, I could spend a quarter hour absorbed in a painting that had previously not engaged me at all.
Pleasure learning is responsible for convergence in aesthetic attitudes. Given broad similarities in their mental make-up, humans often converge—with the aid of experimentation, instruction, and shared culture—on inter-comparable ways of appreciating art. Some of my commentators, including Karl Ameriks and Gorodeisky, suggest that only objective value can explain this inter-comparability and convergence; but I put the weight on inter-subjective similarities in reward psychology, not on some irreducibly aesthetic quality in the work.
Importantly, psychological similarities can also ground persuasion. ‘Look at how he plays with memory,’ somebody says when I complain about Proust’s long sentences: so now I almost enjoy the twisting syntax. Much of what is taken to be rational grounding can be reinterpreted in this way. Gorodeisky writes: ‘The best and simplest explanation of [aesthetic agreement] appeals to whether or not each of us is properly responsive to the value of the work’ [REF]. My deletions result in triviality, I admit: we agree because we agree. But that’s my point. What does objective value add in explanatory terms to the psychological convergence of evaluation? (I’d ask Ameriks and Sinnerbrink the same question.)
In his sympathetic yet insightfully critical commentary, Ammon Allred explores how we come to value initially unpleasant things:
Experiences that are ‘naturally’ displeasures can become (by what Schiller called ‘the aesthetic education of man’) pleasurable . . . because art can present almost any ugly thing . . . as beautiful (because the free play of the imagination and the understanding expands the kinds of objects that we can take pleasure in). [Allred: 129–33]
Gorodeisky and Sinhababu make similar remarks.
Actually, I would go further. Many unpleasant stimuli remain aversive, but come to contribute to the pleasure we take from the artworks in which they occur. Think of Bosch’s ‘Garden of Earthly Delights’; it takes a sick mind to enjoy looking at a naked man being devoured whole by a giant bird while a flock of blackbirds flies from his anus. Schiller notwithstanding, there is no aesthetic reward in contemplating these scenes taken by themselves. The appreciation comes from context—for example, from how Bosch plays the grotesque off against the carnal. In fact, he makes the carnal quite creepy, thus inverting Schiller’s pain-to-pleasure transition. The aesthetic way of looking reconstructs these delights and horrors; whether they are unpleasant or delightful in isolation is irrelevant.
This kind of reflection sounds intellectual, and often it is. But it does not follow that it grounds rational appraisal. This, I believe, is where Ameriks and I part company. We concur that pleasure stimulates further engagement; but Ameriks takes appreciation to be ‘objective’, while for me the only objective fact on the horizon is whether you (and creatures like you) can get pleasure of this self-reinforcing kind from a work contemplated in a particular way. If there is a difference between the pleasure of art and the pleasure of savouring food, it rests (contrary to Kant) not on the arationality of savouring, but on its close connection with satisfying bodily needs [target article: 747–760].
If Kant were right, the appreciation of art across cultures would be based on universal canons of rationality, and I see no evidence of this. I’m just not into Flemish still-life painting; I find it depressing. How will you prove me wrong?
4.	Varieties of Pleasure
The target paper distinguishes two kinds of pleasure—relief or r-pleasure, and facilitating or f-pleasure. Aesthetic pleasure is a kind of f-pleasure.
R-pleasure arises from the cessation of a psychological state that is costly and effortful to maintain. But because it welcomes relief after it has occurred, it does not motivate or facilitate the relief event.
F-pleasure attends a temporally extended activity. It motivates the continuation of this activity and releases a facilitating nexus or f-nexus: a suite of coordinated attitudes and modes of acting that together motivate, ease, and optimize the activity. The nexus is specific to the activity; consequently, f-pleasure is specifically directed to the activity, not to the object itself.
Reading and enjoying The Tale of Genji requires effort and drains your cognitive resources; as well, its implicit approval of rape taxes your tolerance. (Allred rightly references Mapplethorpe and the revolutionary consequences of reflecting on initial disgust [Allred: 168–80]. I wonder what he makes of righteous revulsion at an author’s transgressions.) Pleasure motivates you to expend the effort and keep reading. It also activates a nexus—attentive reading, obliviousness to your surroundings, opening yourself to the charms of guileless seduction, cultural contextualization. The pleasure of reading a great novel in a certain way reinforces this way of reading novels of the same type (despite there being some examples of the genre that fail to give you any pleasure).
Paul Guyer suggests that r- and f-pleasure are not separable because ‘real and imagined sexual pleasure’ involve aspects of both [111]. Now it is certainly right that sex often involves both kinds of pleasure—relief from longing when it begins and relief from sexual tension when it ends in orgasm; while it is in progress, it also involves facilitating pleasure that makes us want to continue and aids us in doing things that enhance our enjoyment. But my claim, contrary to Guyer, is that these two kinds of pleasure are distinct and play very different roles in our psychology and motivation. To make this clearer, think of eating: the pleasure of savouring food is surely different from that of relieving hunger, though the two are intertwined. If I haven’t eaten for a couple of days, even stale bread may give me r-pleasure; but it is unlikely that I would enjoy savouring it. A similar distinction holds for sex: there is pleasure in the reliefs just mentioned, and there is pleasure that shapes the act itself. These are different and play different roles. Relieving sexual deprivation is fine; orgasm is great. (Don’t just take it from me.) Both are distinct from the pleasures of caressing and being caressed, which are f-pleasures.
Now consider Du Bos’s claim [Guyer: 137–42] that cognitive activity provides relief from boredom. To my way of thinking, this is incomplete. Boredom is a mental state that is both unpleasant and hard to maintain; the mind searches for attentive focus but finds none [Merrifield and Danckert 2013]. My model predicts that ending boredom would bring relief pleasure. However, it is a mistake to think that interesting activity gives pleasure merely because it staves off boredom. For as Guyer observes, there is a kind of pleasure that ‘is connected with the continuation of an activity rather than with the cessation of an extant (and painful) condition’ [216–217]. This kind of pleasure—f-pleasure—releases a nexus that specifically facilitates this activity. The nature of this activity is not that it relieves boredom; it could have been taken up even when one was not bored.
I find less to concur with in Ryan Doran’s development of similar ideas. His summary of my view of pleasure is mistaken in large and small ways. I don’t take r-pleasure to arise from desire or f-pleasure from self-appraisal; my view of f-pleasure has little in common with Csíkszentmihályi’s ‘flow’. My idea of the f-nexus involves more than attention and executive control. Doran’s Figure 2—his ‘simple view’—is the same as my Figure 1, except in so far as it substitutes generic pleasure for f-pleasure. In effect, this would make all pleasure f-pleasure. But he neglects to acknowledge that the notion of a facilitating nexus is original to me, and simply appropriates it to his ‘simple view’.
Despite subsuming all pleasure under f-pleasure, Doran insists that thirsty drinking [target article: 58–75] is an r-pleasure. This misses the point that Allred summarizes so well: ‘the pleasure one gets from eating any old thing when starving’ is different from ‘the pleasure that hunger motivates in the aesthetic experience of savouring’ [Allred REF]. For Doran, aesthetic pleasure is ‘like an armchair that provides relaxation from fatigue’, a way to find relief from suffering [Doran REF]. I agree, of course, that art can be a source of solace, just as relaxing in one’s armchair might be; but I don’t see how this makes either of these an r-pleasure.
Doran offers the pleasure of harmonic resolution as an example of r-pleasure, taking it for granted that because it is evoked by music, it must be aesthetic. But I don’t think that harmonic resolution is in itself an aesthetic pleasure. As I said earlier, my view of aesthetic pleasure is that it arises from one’s mental engagement with an object; a visceral reaction elicited by some standard trope or trick does not count, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant. The resolution of a dissonance may give pleasure, but that pleasure does not arise from contemplating a composition. Enjoying Holst’s use of resolution is aesthetic pleasure; but taken by itself and out of context, the resolution of particular dissonances is not. I actually intend to deny that this sort of pleasure is aesthetic; it is not an unnoticed slip. (I say more about this in sections 5 and 6 below.)
5.	The Phenomenological Disunity of Pleasure
Pleasure is not of one single phenomenal kind. The feeling of calm induced by meditation counts as pleasure, as do the elation of mild alcoholic intoxication, the stimulation of umami in grilled meat, the excitement of competitive sport, the turbulence of sexual arousal, and so on. (Feldman 1988 is a classic discussion of this heterogeneity.) These feelings are phenomenally diverse, yet each reinforces the activity that gives rise to it. I do not believe that pleasure is plausibly considered a unitary type of sensation, accompanying each diverse activity; moreover, I do not think that f-pleasure, including aesthetic pleasure, is merely reactive or passive. Many objections to pleasure-based theories of appreciation are predicated on pleasure being conceived this way.
Immediate sensuous pleasure arises from the quiet tones and brightening ornamentation of Adithi Ravichandran’s morning raga [http://tinyurl.com/j (​http:​/​​/​tinyurl.com​/​zslj73j​)]. Listening to the raga gives me aesthetic pleasure; pleasure derived from other activities relative to it is not aesthetic. The pleasure that comes from pride in my expertise, or my zeal in offering a technical analysis of the music, is different and additional. The pleasure is therefore about the raga—the object of pleasure—only at a remove, through the activity of listening to it and not through other activities that involve it. This is my take on ‘disinterested pleasure’; the pleasure of art is disinterested because all other pleasure taken in the raga is beside the point.
Phillips says that to retain disinterestedness, I must ‘disavow the enmeshedness of the work of art in human interests’ [REF]. I don’t think this is right. F-pleasure is pleasure in a specific activity, and the aesthetic type of f-pleasure is object-directed only through mental engagement with the object. But this is compatible with all kinds of other appraising and cognitive attitudes being linked to mental engagement. My requirement is that the pleasure of art arise solely from the activity of contemplating the object, not that other ‘human interests’ be excluded from the scope of that contemplation. As well, I allow that there can be other attitudes, other manifestations of human interests, relative to the same object: this is what the examples of the Duke and the actor’s proud father are supposed to demonstrate.
The authors cited by Phillips take a narrow view of pleasure. He quotes Adorno:
For anyone who is close to works of art, they are no more objects of delight than is his own breathing . . . like a modern inhabitant of a medieval town who replies with a peremptory ‘yes, yes’, when a visitor remarks on the beauty of the buildings. [REF]
On one reading, this is just silly: I hope that Adorno doesn’t mean to compare his ‘connoisseurs’ to the bored museum guard who spends one mind-numbing day after another minding visitors to the Rubens room. On another reading, Adorno is homogenizing ‘delight’: he is pointing out that hearts don’t have to beat faster when they confront a great work of art. For my penny’s worth, I concur.
Phillips notes, quite rightly, that the term ‘aesthetic’ has been used many different ways in the history of philosophy. But as I think he realizes, my project isn’t to synthesize these diverse opinions. My aim is first-order—to discover a common element in what might seem to be diverse psychological attitudes. I do not pursue the more reflective second-order aim of drawing together what philosophers have said about these attitudes. This is why I don’t feel, when I propose a plausible take on what Kant meant by ‘disinterested pleasure’, that I need to take everything else Kant said on board. In particular, I don’t adopt what he says about aesthetic judgment.
6.	The Importance of Human Psychology
A work’s aesthetic merit rests on its capacity to give pleasure when a subject engages with it in a certain way. This depends on our aesthetic psychology and our cultural orientation; if these had been different, the work would not give aesthetic pleasure even though it is engaged with in the same way.
Freeland [25] suspects that my position commits me to a certain kind of objectivism:
He implicitly accepts an objective account of aesthetic value. That is, the relevant source of my pleasure [is] located in the object itself. . . . The ‘fit’ between our psychology and the object is genuine and not just a matter of our attitudes. [Freeland: 117–22; cf. Gorodeisky REF]
This is right, except for the lack of qualification in the first sentence. It is a matter of fact, not a matter of subjective assessment, whether an object has the capacity to give me aesthetic pleasure. This marks an objective determinant of aesthetic merit. However, this capacity of the object depends on the contours of my capacity for pleasurable reactions. So aesthetic value is not ‘externalist’ in the sense delineated by James Shelley (as quoted by Freeland [85–92]); it does not rest solely on features external to experience. Unlike Sinnerbrink and Gorodeisky then, I take aesthetic properties like beauty to depend on human attitudes.
Think of the example Peter Kivy [1968: 89] gives (quoting Geiringer [1947: 293]): ‘It is typical of Haydn’s art that a slightly modified repetition of the main idea is used instead of the subsidiary subject.’ This is purely descriptive and non-relational, hence ‘objective’ in the relevant sense; but Kivy says it helps account for listeners’ perception of Haydn’s music as ‘unified’ or ‘coherent’—these being aesthetic aspects of the work. First, I would observe that it is psychologically and culturally contingent which alterations of extended musical themes will count as ‘the same’ or ‘slightly modified’. (For instance, harmonic modulations do not have the same significance across distinct musical traditions.) Second, it is contingent that this kind of sameness is perceived as a source of unity—and even that unity is thought to be pleasing. Consequently, Haydn’s compositional techniques may not affect in the same way listeners who are unfamiliar with the western musical tradition.
Sinnerbrink [168–70] says that my ‘rejection of the “independent aesthetic merit of the object” leaves hanging the question of what initiates f-pleasure’. I hope this is wrong: my position is that aesthetic pleasure is initiated by non-aesthetic properties, and that aesthetic merit arises from the degree to which the work makes this possible. Beauty and other indices of merit do not exist independently of mental engagement. Perhaps this point can be made most clearly in the context of something Gorodeisky says, paraphrasing Susan Wolf: art ‘would have nothing recognizable as value if there were no human subjects capable of appreciating them’ [Gorodeisky REF]. It’s a little unclear to me how this is compatible with the ‘externality’ of aesthetic value in the sense of James Shelley. However that might be, I am committed to something stronger: art would have no value if it didn’t engage specific psychological structures in specific cultural contexts.
The same response can be made to Ameriks, who says that if I foreground mental engagement with objects I must concede ‘that what fundamentally matters is objective intentional structure after all’ [Ameriks: 79–80]. I ‘concede’ exactly this: crucially, I hold that aesthetic qualities and assessments depend on how creatures with a particular psychological makeup engage with the non-aesthetic properties of an object. Aesthetic qualities do not figure in the ‘objective intentional structure’, at least not if ‘objective’ means ‘wholly mind-independent’. (This, by the way, is why I do not think that I fall prey to the objection, which Ameriks presses, that it’s all the same to me whether or not aesthetic pleasure is merely simulated.)
7.	Pleasure Learning Again
In the background of my discussion is a desire to understand why art is universal [Dutton 2009; Matthen 2015]. Why is there art in every culture? Some psychologists try to understand this in terms of qualities that are found appealing everywhere; they shove people into fMRI machines and record pleasure reactions to presentations as brief as 250 ms. Suppose this procedure reveals that everybody regardless of culture likes to hear a dissonance resolved. (Some make this claim, but I don’t believe it: Do connoisseurs of Karnatak music really get the same pleasure as Europeans do out of harmonic resolution?) Such investigators hold that art itself is appealing across cultures because of these ubiquitous natural preferences (cf. Palmer et al. [2013]), or other cross-cultural commonalities in how the brain processes aesthetic objects [Cela-Conde et al. 2013].
This kind of approach is doomed to failure for two reasons. First, no art-form deals solely, or even dominantly, with ‘aesthetic universals’—or more accurately, universal pleasure-reactions. Art-forms are highly sophisticated and elaborated; in every culture, they include the use of tropes and devices that would be far less attractive in unrelated cultures.
Second (and relatedly), there is a deep misunderstanding here of what art is. What such approaches neglect is that art always involves elaboration. I call this a ‘secondary attractor’ of art [Matthen 2015], meaning not that it is secondary in importance, but that it builds on the immediately pleasant features of a work: the primary attractors. Why do we remember Chuck Berry, but forget his legions of imitators? Not because the imitators fail to parade the same primary attractors (a driving beat, for example), but because Berry’s style of musical expression is brilliant in ways that transcend these. Joe Perry makes the point in Rolling Stone:
His music is very economical. His guitar leads drove the rhythm, as opposed to laying over the top. The economy of his licks and his leads—they pushed the song along. And he would build his solos so there was a nice little statement taking the song to a new place, so you’re ready for the next verse. [http://tinyurl.com/spk5 (​http:​/​​/​tinyurl.com​/​hz2spk5​)]
These are very specific qualities; they require discrimination and experience and go well beyond whatever immediately attractive, easily reproduced features are present in Berry’s music. Yet fine appreciation of this sort exists in every culture and defines what will count as art. The only aesthetic universal, then, is that art always involves the elaboration of fine detail; content is not universal. 
In her perceptive critique, Jane Kneller realises that appreciation of this kind of elaboration is what I miss in our attitudes to natural beauty. She writes: ‘His conjecture that nature provides less for individuals to work with, aesthetically speaking, is the crux of his argument. Engaging in aesthetic reflection upon nature is simply too easy on the whole’ [Kneller REF]. Kneller does not say that we prize elaboration in nature; she would agree that there is nothing here to correspond with the way Joe Perry describes Chuck Berry. But, she argues, ‘those who have studied natural objects all their lives are far more likely to “see” the enormous detail and fine-grained intricacies of the object.’ This is exactly the argument that is needed to make her point. I have to say, though, that I am sceptical that nature appreciation meets the standard. Maybe I just haven’t encountered enough nature-criticism, but it strikes me that there isn’t much to say about it. Allen Carlson (another prominent defender of nature-aesthetics) pursues a similar line: ‘Your whole line of thought would be more on target as an analysis of the pleasure of appreciation rather than of aesthetic pleasure (whatever that might be)’ [personal communication]. I am unsympathetic, but the question is empirical—how much do sophisticated ways of contemplating nature contribute to the pleasure we take from it?
Pleasure-reinforced learning accounts for the universality of artistic elaboration amidst the cultural specificity of artistic content. My idea here is twofold. First, we experiment with different ways of engaging with an object [target article: section 8]. Some of these give more pleasure and are consequently reinforced by instrumental learning; for example, certain modes of attentive appraisal increase pleasure and thus become part of appreciation [target article: section 10]. This is, second, where the object comes in; Las Meninas is more apt for pleasure learning than a velvet Elvis painting (to use Freeland’s example REF), and The Ambassadors more than The Da Vinci Code (Gorodeisky REF). As I said earlier, this is an objective fact, but it depends on psychology and culture. In saying this, I do not wish to deny that somebody’s pleasure in the velvet Elvis is real, as Sinnerbrink thinks I must; I am simply making a claim about its growth potential and long-term sustainability. Gorodeisky [REF] says that the pleasure of reading Dan Brown is ‘more intense’ than that of reading Henry James. She may be right; but if you approach him in the right way, James keeps giving while Brown is forgettable without loss. Actually, I enjoy Brown’s thrillers. But ask yourself: why is The Girl on the Train so much more compelling?
Contrary to Sinnerbrink [176–87], I don’t find a psychologically grounded conception of the aesthetic circular. In my account, aesthetic pleasure is indeed evoked, as Sinnerbrink says, ‘by something about the object in question’ [171]. But that something is a culturally embedded factual complex. What makes Las Meninas such a good fit for our aesthetic psychology? Obviously this needs to be investigated, but I certainly don’t feel that I must make an unpalatable choice between saying ‘its aptness to please’ (which would be circular) and ‘its beauty/grace/harmony’ (which would be an externalist appeal to aesthetic qualities). Rather, I try to explain how an evaluative feeling of pleasure arises from non-aesthetic qualities. I could be quite inclusive about what is involved here. Guyer urges throughout his learned and incisive commentary that our engagement with works of art should go beyond the cognitive, and take in also the imaginative and the affective. I agree, and I wish I had said more about this. Maybe in the future I will.
This brings me to an important point. I hold that art seeks to build up a certain kind of self-reinforcing response. Ameriks thinks this process must be rationally grounded, for otherwise it ‘does not explain why it can be said that an appropriate kind of pleasure, concerning a given intentional object, is generated in the first place’. I disagree. I think that you can first engage with an object for all kinds of adventitious reasons—misplaced pleasure, a quest for novelty, a direction from a guidebook. (It is said that Courbet painted ‘The Origin of the World’ for Pasha Khalil Bey’s collection of visual pornography.) The point about art is that even from such inapposite beginnings, pleasure-reinforced and culturally informed learning will converge. Stable forms of appreciation are built up blindly from less informed, less appropriate forms of pleasure. The scrutiny that can be applied to my attitudes late in such a process mimics detached rationality; the attraction that first brings me to the process does not. Again, note the structural parallel with Darwinian natural selection: organisms appear to be the products of intelligent design, but in fact their features result from initial randomness and subsequent fit with natural environments.
I believe these remarks address the objectivist strain in many of my commentators, including Freeland and Sinnerbrink and especially Guyer, Gorodeisky, and Ameriks.
8.	Culture
The process of culturally informed pleasure learning serves for me as a source of aesthetic evaluation, though I should say right off that evaluation is not my primary subject matter. My aim is to eschew appeals to mind-independent parameters of aesthetic merit. As an aesthetic hedonist, I hold that aesthetic merit consists in the capacity to elicit a special kind of pleasure. Correspondingly, aesthetic sensibility consists in the ability to find a maximally pleasurable way of engaging with an object.
Culture is an essential background condition of enjoyment, for me because it is an essential component of pleasure-reinforced learning. Assumptions I share with an artist, about both the form and the content of artistic productions, enable me to enjoy her work. To the extent that I fall short, I am unable to appreciate the work to its full potential. These assumptions result in wide interpersonal comparability (though not necessarily agreement) of aesthetic judgments within a culture. So my version of aesthetic hedonism makes room for communication and convergence, but it also allows for wide discrepancies of judgment across art-forms and cultures.
I take this to be a virtue. People do come to agreement on aesthetic matters; and not to give a rich account of this would be to fall short. My theory demystifies what many, including Freeland and Gorodeisky, take to be aesthetic objectivity. That is, it gives an account of how such convergence happens. On the other hand, it also gives an account of how there can be a sharp divergence between some who love the Moonlight Sonata and some who love ‘Roll Over Beethoven’. Objectivists can account for such divergence only by positing either a lack of value in one of these or an error in those who appreciate one but not the other. I attribute the difference to a lack of pleasure learning in one or other camp. And as I said before, I can account for the universality of art as well as the divergence of artistic traditions and art forms.
On the other hand, Sinnerbrink is right that more needs to be said about the cultural grounding of aesthetic merit and sensibility. Hélène is a synaesthete; when she listens to Mozart, she experiences a marvellously structured colour display. Attentive appraisal of this display affords her, together with more conventional ways of listening to the music, greater aesthetic pleasure than the non-synaesthete, Alfred, can enjoy. Does Hélène have greater sensibility than Alfred? Suppose Bach does not translate very well into synaesthetic displays, with the consequence that Hélène’s enhanced enjoyment of Mozart is greater than her enjoyment of Bach. Would she be right to value Mozart more than Bach? And what about Freeland’s champagne-fuelled enjoyment of the opera? Is this a new way of enjoying it? Finally, imagine an eighteenth-century novel that inadvertently raises questions about the use of social media in the 21st century. Does the contemporary context give us a legitimate way of enjoying it? One way of approaching all of these questions is to examine the extent to which they involve something other than the object of aesthetic appraisal. But this demands elaboration that can only be postponed to another occasion.
9.	Aesthetic Hedonism
Aesthetic subjectivism is a family of views in which aesthetic qualities are at least partially mind-dependent; stronger forms make it more dependent, weaker forms less. Aesthetic hedonism is a strong form of subjectivism. It holds that aesthetic value depends entirely on pleasure.
Though it does not allow non-pleasure-related determinants of value, hedonism itself can be stronger and weaker with regard to mind-dependence. In my version, aesthetic merit rests on a capacity to elicit pleasure, not on occurrent pleasure—and just not any kind of pleasure, but specifically aesthetic pleasure, as I describe it. The merit or value of a Kathakali performance does not rest on the pleasure it happens to give me now, which may be none. Rather, it rests on the aesthetic pleasure it is capable of giving a suitably cultured person—me, if I were such a person. (All of this is again why, contrary to Ameriks, I do not think that ‘the cultivation of experiences merely for their own sake’ [70] is aesthetic. There is nothing in objectless experience that provides the feedback that reinforces intelligent exploration.)
Aesthetic subjectivists hold that aesthetic qualities are constituted to some extent by their interactions with some mental faculty, from which it follows that they cannot exist unmodified without the operation of this mental faculty. To illustrate, Frank Sibley argued that the use of aesthetic terms such as ‘unified’, ‘balanced’, ‘integrated’, ‘lifeless’, ‘serene’, etc. ‘requires the exercise of taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic discrimination or appreciation’ [Sibley 1959: 421]. Sibley was not committed to subjectivism. But if we think that ‘taste’ and ‘discrimination’ can legitimately operate differently in different individuals and different cultural contexts, there is a direct route from Sibley’s view to a subjectivist position.
As I remarked earlier, subjectivism can be quite weak; it can allow that there are many objective partial determinants of aesthetic qualities. As well, even where these qualities and aesthetic value depend on individual mental attitudes and responses, it can allow that there are homogenizing influences that make for wide uniformity across subjects. Aesthetic hedonism runs somewhat parallel; it pins aesthetic merit to pleasure, but it may affirm that people discuss and converge on assessments of value.
Here is what I propose, then (though I didn’t in the target article, and I will not be able to give a detailed defence here):
AH: Aesthetic value arises from a work’s capacity to elicit aesthetic pleasure.
Crucially, I mean aesthetic pleasure as I defined it in the target article and in section 1, above.
Ameriks says that the production of pleasure is ‘not the primary aim of a great artist’s work’ [REF], and I agree if he means to be talking about a mere feeling. But I would say that it is the primary aim of a work of art to evoke the special sort of feeling that motivates and facilitates mental engagement with it. AH should not be confused with the view that art aims simply at fun.
10.	Aesthetic Value and Other Values
Ethical hedonists such as Protagoras and Bentham hold that pleasure is good-making. This connection is meant to be normatively primitive. Let’s call this the hedonistic grounding principle (HGP). Here is an example of how HGP works:
I am luxuriating by a lake on a warm summer evening. This gives me great pleasure, which is a ground for valuing what I doing. (Of course, this can be outweighed by other considerations; there might be urgent things I should be attending to instead.)
Hedonists also think that pleasure is the only source of value. I do not agree with this.
I have no view about HGP. My position has to do with aesthetic value; HGP is about value as such. There is a difference between value simpliciter and aesthetic value. I do not claim that aesthetic value contributes to value as such. It is therefore compatible with my position that aesthetic pleasure does not ground value as such, not even defeasibly. Looking at a Rothko gives me sensuous pleasure; HGP implies that this makes the Rothko (defeasibly) good as such. But nothing follows about aesthetic goodness. My view is independent of HGP: aesthetic merit consists in the capacity to elicit aesthetic pleasure. Ameriks says that HGP builds ‘a bridge from mere fact to value’ [51]. This is very apposite; HGP says that pleasure is good. But this is tangential, since I do not use HGP to infer aesthetic merit from pleasure as such.
I’ll end by glancing at an important point that Allred raises. Art can transform one’s morals; his example is Mapplethorpe, who transforms initial disgust into sympathetic appreciation. He suggests that such transformations must be judged by their moral worth. ‘Describing what must be true of any aesthetic experience irrespective of its ideological or critical role fails to properly account for the normative force of critical art specifically’ [REF]. This is, I think, an important insight. Earlier, I mentioned the Lady Murakami’s condoning of rape. What effect does this have on our aesthetic appreciation of her Tale of Genji, and how should this contrast with our reception of Mapplethorpe? A profound question; but perhaps one that I do not need to answer. My concern is with aesthetic pleasure as the determinant of aesthetic value. I can’t say I have dealt with the moral ramifications of either.
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